In recent years, more companies are disclosing free cash flow in their earnings announcements. Free cash flow is not a required part of disclosure, and there is no standard GAAP definition. We examine which companies voluntarily disclose free cash flow, what definition they disclose, and how the market reacts. Companies choose a wide variety of definitions for disclosed free cash flow, none of which correspond to free cash flow as defined by finance theory. The most common definition is operating cash flow minus capital expenditures, which comprises 45% of the free cash flow disclosures. The decision to initate free cash flow disclosure appears to be primarily opportunistic, in that the timing coincides with periods where free cash flows tend to be positive and increasing. Continued disclosure is related to proxies for the informativeness of free cash flows. The market reacts to idiosyncratic adjustments to the most common definition of free cash flow, suggesting that managers' choice of how to define free cash flow provides value-relevant information to the market.
Introduction
In recent years, more and more companies have started voluntarily disclosing "free cash flow" to supplement earnings figures in their earnings announcements. During 2004, less than 10% of the Standard and Poor's 1500 firms in our sample disclosed free cash flow in their earnings announcement; by 2015, this fraction increased to almost 20%. According to Jensen (1986, p. 323), free cash flow in finance theory is defined as "cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital." 1 However, free cash flow is not a required part of financial statement disclosure, and there is no standard accounting definition of free cash flow under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). When a company chooses to disclose free cash flow in an earnings release, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires the company to provide a definition and reconciliation with reported financial statements.
2 As we will show, companies choose a wide variety of definitions for disclosed free cash flow, none of which correspond to free cash flow as defined by finance theory.
This trend raises several related research questions. Which companies choose to disclose free cash flow, and why? Which definitions of free cash flow do firms choose to report, and how do they make this choice? Are these choices informative or opportunistic? And how does the market react? Do investors respond incrementally to the information disclosed in free cash flow?
To address these questions, we collect data on free cash flow disclosure in the annual earnings announcements for Standard and Poor's 1500 firms from 2004 through October 2016.
Results show that the most common definition of free cash flow disclosed by our sample firms is operating cash flow minus capital expenditures, the choice made in 45% of the free cash flow disclosures. The remaining disclosures have some additional adjustments, but there is very little consensus regarding which adjustments.
Free cash flow is an alternative performance metric. A common alternative measure examined in the accounting literature is non-GAAP earnings. Prior literature examines whether the disclosure of "non-GAAP" earnings is motivated by information or opportunism. For example, Lougee and Marquardt (2004) show that firms are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings when GAAP earnings are likely to be less informative. Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman (2003) , however, provide evidence that the amounts "excluded" from GAAP earnings to reach non-GAAP earnings are correlated with future cash outflows and future negative abnormal returns, consistent with the opportunistic exclusion of recurring expenses. We extend this literature by examining the determinants of the choice to disclose free cash flow. We find that firms with positive and increasing free cash flow are more likely to begin disclosing free cash flow, which we interpret as evidence of opportunistism. Once initiated, however, ongoing disclosure is more strongly related to proxies for the informativeness of earnings, suggesting that providing higher quality information for investors motivates the decision to continue disclosing free cash flows. We also document that disclosure (both initial and ongoing) is higher for larger firms, for firms that also disclose non-GAAP earnings, and for firms in industries where more peers disclose free cash flow.
Regarding the choice of which definition to disclose, as noted above, the most popular definition is the simplest, operating cash flow minus capital expenditures. We examine the determinants of a firm's decision to choose a definition other than this simple definition. These results show that firms for whom free cash flow is expected to be more informative (including those with higher capital intensity and more one-time events) are more likely to report a free cash flow definition other than the simple definition. These results suggest to us that there is meaningful information in the individual choices managers make when they determine which free cash flow measure to report. However, firms for which free cash flow calculated according to the simple definition is increasing are less likely to report an adjusted figure, suggesting there may also be an element of opportunism.
We find that the market does not respond to disclosed free cash flow incrementally to earnings news. But, the market does react significantly to cross-sectional variation in the adjustments managers make beyond the simple definition of free cash flow. These results provide evidence that managers' choice of what to include in free cash flow provides valuerelevant information to the market.
Although free cash flow has long been touted as fundamental to valuation and thus price formation, little evidence exists as to how managers disclose this information, or how investors use it. We show that market participants respond incrementally to information in the choice of which free cash flow definition to disclose. As such, our research contributes to the literature on the information content of firms' disclosure choices (see Section 3, below, for a review of this literature).
Extensive prior research documents that the stock price incorporates information in earnings [e.g., Ball and Brown (1968) ; Kormendi and Lipe (1987) ]. We provide evidence that free cash flow offers supplemental information to earnings, thereby contributing to the earnings announcement literature as well as the finance literature.
Finally, our results also have potential policy implications. Our study highlights how difficult it is for investors to calculate free cash flow as defined by theory given the current disclosure rules. Extensive prior academic literature empirically tests the agency costs of free cash flow as discussed in Jensen (1986) . There appears to be no consensus in this empirical literature regarding how to calculate free cash flow in the agency setting. Definitions vary in part due to differences in the theoretical setting, but also because of data availability on Compustat. 3 Collectively, our results suggest that investors and academic researchers may be receptive to increased and more standardized disclosure of free cash flow. It is likely that the lack of a standardized measure leads to some of the variants we see disclosed, suggesting that some structure over this variable might be beneficial. If all managers begin from the same base, incremental adjustments may become even more informative.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we compare free cash flow and earnings. We discuss our theoretical predictions and related literature in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe our sample. We describe determinants of the decision to disclose free cash flow in Section 5, and explore the market reaction to free cash flow disclosures in Section 6.
In Section 7, we conclude.
Overview of Free Cash Flow versus Earnings
Although many accounting researchers and practitioners focus on earnings, in finance the emphasis is on free cash flow. Accrual accounting is designed so that revenues are reported when income is earned and expenses are matched with related revenues. So, for example, although a company may make a large capital expenditure to buy equipment in one period, this cost may be charged as depreciation expense over several years to represent the fact that the company will derive benefits from this equipment for an extended period of time. In this way, earnings as defined in the context of accrual accounting reflect earned revenues less the cost to produce those revenues, regardless of the timing of cash flows.
The finance focus on free cash flow stems from an emphasis on maximizing value, which dates back at least to Fisher (1930) . As summarized in Rubenstein (2003, p. 48) :
"Fisher develops the first formal equilibrium model of an economy with both intertemporal exchange and production. In so doing, at one swoop, he not only derives present value calculations as a natural economic outcome in calculating wealth, he also justifies the maximization of present value as the goal of production and derives determinants of the interest rates that are used to calculate present value."
One reason free cash flow differs from earnings is because free cash flow attempts to account for the actual timing of cash inflows and outflows in order to calculate their present value correctly.
Adjustments in the free cash flow calculation related to "undoing" accrual accounting (such as non-cash charges, capital expenditures, and change in working capital) are made for this reason.
Thus, free cash flow is closer to cash earnings than earnings produced with accrual accounting.
Free cash flow adjustments result in a number that is similar but not identical to cash flow from operations minus capital expenditures as reported on a company's statement of cash flows.
The second difference between free cash flow and earnings is that free cash flow ignores interest expense (and any other payments to capital providers, such as dividends or debt repayment). Consistent with this approach, Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2015, p. 30 ) define free cash flow as "the cash flow generated by the core operations of the business after deducting investments in new capital." Berk and DeMarzo (2017, p. 247) The definition in equation (4) corresponds most closely to the components as they are reported on publicly available GAAP financial statements. Operating cash flow and both gross capital expenditures and proceeds from the sale of fixed assets appear directly on the Statement of Cash flows, and (pre-tax) interest expense is reported on the Income Statement or in a footnote.
However, several practical issues arise for analysts attempting to calculate free cash flow using publicly available financial statements (or for researchers attempting to do so with Compustat data). First, the company's marginal tax rate is not directly observed, so it needs to be estimated.
5 Second, this figure should also incorporate current year investment in assets acquired using capital leases (we discuss this nuance in detail in Appendix 1).
Finally, operating cash flow may include transitory (cash) charges, which should be excluded from the theoretical free cash flow calculation if the goal is to identify ongoing free cash flows (for example, for forecasting or valuation purposes). Many firms present non-GAAP earnings metrics that exclude transitory items from their estimation of core or recurring earnings.
Removing transitory items from free cash flow is challenging because the income-statement amount includes both cash and accrual effects, and these effects are not disclosed separately by most firms. As we describe later, some firms remove the effects of these transitory cash items from the definition of free cash flows presented in the earnings announcement. For other firms, however, it can be difficult to obtain complete information on (cash) transitory charges from reported disclosure statements.
Overall, for several reasons it may be challenging to calculate free cash flow as defined in finance theory based on information disclosed in accordance with current financial reporting standards. Perhaps in response to this challenge, some companies are starting to disclose free cash flow in their earnings announcements. Do these efforts provide meaningful new information to the market or do they lead our understanding of a company's underlying cash flow generating capacity further astray? We address this question in this paper.
5 Although users can impute a firm's effective tax rate, that rate is an average across all profits in all countries in which the firm files tax returns. Also, there are some situations when you would want the marginal rate rather than the average rate (for example, evaluating an incremental project). The effective rate is an average, rather than marginal, rate.
Theory and Related Literature
Since seminal early work documenting the stock price reaction to information in earnings announcements [Ball and Brown 1968 and Kormendi and Lipe 1987] exists a policy of disclosure that makes all shareholders better off than a policy of no disclosure.
In Boot and Thakor (2001) , information disclosure will affect stock prices both directly, by revealing information, and indirectly, by affecting incentives of investors to collect information.
They highlight a growing interest in price transparency and information disclosure, because disclosure affects trading volume which in turn has consequences for capital market growth. Which companies choose to disclose free cash flow, and why? We explore two alternative (but not mutually exclusive) hypotheses: information or opportunism. We expect managers to disclose free cash flow when the amount will be incrementally informative over earnings, which are a required disclosure in the earnings announcement. Since the free cash flow calculation adjusts for accruals in earnings, we expect free cash flow to be more informative for firms with large accruals. This group includes capital intensive firms with large capital expenditures and firms with larger differences between GAAP and cash accounting (such as firms with restrictive revenue recognition policies). 6 Free cash flow may also be more important for more highly levered firms, because the adjustment to remove interest expense and calculate unlevered free cash flows in equation (4) is larger in magnitude for firms with more debt.
Although we are the first to examine free cash flow disclosure, research on non-GAAP earnings provides evidence that non-GAAP earnings tend to be disclosed in firms where GAAP earnings are less informative, and thus less useful for valuation. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that non-GAAP disclosures are more prevalent for growth firms, firms with more volatile earnings, firms with higher market-to-book ratios, and firms with transitory charges, where higher levels of each of these variables proxy for lower earnings informativeness. to be more informative than GAAP earnings. Applying these predictions to free cash flow disclosure, we expect free cash flow will be more informative for growth firms and for firms with higher market-to-book ratios, more volatile earnings, and more transitory charges. If the primary motive for disclosing free cash flows is to provide meaningful information to the market, firms with these characteristics should be more likely to choose to disclose free cash flow in their earnings announcements.
However, there are also a number of studies documenting that the amounts excluded from GAAP earnings to reach non-GAAP earnings appear to contain an element of opportunism. In particular, non-GAAP usage is more prevalent when GAAP earnings are less than the prior period or fall below the analyst consensus forecast [Lougee and Marquardt (2004) what an investor could infer based on the full set of information
In sum, whether managers are motivated to disclose free cash flows to be informative versus opportunistic is an empirical question. We explore this question by relating the decision to disclose free cash flow to variables that proxy for information or opportunism. We also examine whether information and opportunism variables explain the specific definition chosen, the specific adjustments made, and (conditional on disclosing free cash flows last year) on the decision to stop disclosing. Finally, we examine the market reaction to free cash flow disclosure and its components.
Description of Sample

Sample of Events
To construct our sample, we begin by including all firms listed in the Standard and Poor's [S&P] 1500 at any point during our the initial sample). In order to facilitate analysis of firms' decisions to disclose free cash flow from year to year during our sample, we exclude firms with any annual earnings announcements that do not have a python-identified 8-K filed within four business days of the I/B/E/S filing date. This process leads to a final sample of 1,394 unique firms and allows us to have an uninterrupted time series of data for each sample firm. After merging this data with Compustat, the resulting full sample consists of 13,324 firm-years for these 1,394 unique firms.
We program a text scraper to search each identified earnings release for key phrase of interest: "free cash flow." This program counts the total number of times the phrase is mentioned within a particular earnings release and provides the total number of "mentions" at the firm-year level. Of the 13,324 firm-years in our full sample, the text scraper initially identified 2,333
earnings announcements with at least one mention of "free cash flow." We hand-collect the disclosed free cash flow value from the earnings announcement for each of these observations.
We find that 1,839 of these earnings announcements contain an annual free cash flow value.
Summary Statistics
In Table 1 In Panel B of Table 1 we partition disclosure of free cash flows by industry. 16 As expected, we see wide variation across industries in the propensity to disclose. The telecom industry has the highest disclosure proportion, with 57.3% of the industry firms disclosing free cash flows, followed by the industrials industry with 25.4% of firm-years disclosing free cash flows. These results are consistent with firms in industries with large amounts of capital investments being more likely to disclose free cash flows. Accordingly, the financials industry has the lowest rate of free cash flow disclosers, at just 1.3% of the industry firm-years. Since (OCF -CAPX) is the most popular definition and is based on two line items that are readily available in reported financial statements, in the rest of the paper we refer to this definition as "simple" free cash flow:
Below, we separately analyze the decision to report free cash flows that are adjusted beyond this simple definition.
Not surprisingly given the most popular definition, the vast majority of firms provide a free cash flow value that starts with operating cash flow (85.6% of firms), and the most common adjustment from the starting point is to subtract capital expenditures (85.2%) (see Panels B and C of Table 2 ). Otherwise, there is no real consensus, and the adjustments and definitions appear to be largely idiosyncratic. Some firms (10.3%) adjust capital expenditures for sale of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) and others (5.3%) use cash flow from investing rather than capital expenditures. Although no firms add back after-tax interest, a fair number (10.3%) subtract dividends to obtain a number that is net of both interest expense and dividends. Very few firms in our sample adjust for capital leases. Over 30% made an "other" adjustment (including for capital leases), but we identify no consistent trends or patterns in these other adjustments.
Generally, exclusions from GAAP earnings (such as restructuring charges) result in more positive earnings metrics, so non-GAAP earnings tend to be systematically higher than GAAP earnings. However, the predicted net effect of adjustments to free cash flows is less clear.
Adding back interest and removing the cash effect of transitory items (which tend to be incomedecreasing) will increase the metric, but removing capital investments lowers the value.
In Table 3 we provide descriptive evidence on earnings, disclosed free cash flow, and its components. The average (median) value of disclosed free cash flow is $889 million ($201 million), compared to net income of $685 million ($146 million). Similar to non-GAAP earnings, disclosed free cash flow also tends to be systematically higher than reported net income. Disclosed free cash flow is greater than net income for 1,239 (67.4%) of our firms.
Most companies start their free cash flow calculation with operating cash flow, which averages $1,653 million for our sample disclosers. Capital expenditures average $653 million. Although 32% of our firms make "other" adjustments, these numbers are relatively small with the maximum adjustment of $2.6 billion equating to only about 12% of the maximum value for capital expenditures. Although on average these adjustments increase free cash flows (the mean is a positive $21 million), the median is much smaller (at $2.1 million), and the bottom quartile of "other" adjustments decrease free cash flows.
In Table 3 , we also report Simple FCF (defined as OCF -CAPX, see equation (5)) for our sample of disclosers; as discussed earlier, 45% of our firms report the free cash flow dislosures follow this definition, so the remaining 55% make some incremental adjustments or begin with a starting point other than OCF. The mean simple free cash flow for our firm-years is $884 million, which is very close to the average disclosed free cash flow of $889 million.
Among the 924 firm-year observations for which disclosed free cash flows differs from simple free cash flows, 537 or 58% disclose a higher value than they would have with the simple free cash flow definition, whereas the other 42% disclose a lower amount. Below we explore whether there is information in the cross-sectional variation among firms in choosing these adjustments.
Although disclosure of free cash flow does provide an additional number to the market, this number does not correspond to free cash flow from theory. We next turn our attention to the determinants of a firm's choice to disclose free cash flow to learn more about whether this disclosure choice is informative or opportunistic.
Results: Choice to Disclose Free Cash Flows
Regression Design and Summary Statistics
Which companies choose to disclose free cash flow, and why? To analyze this question, we estimate a determinants model using a logit regression. In this model, we regress a free cash flow indicator variable (which equals one for firms that disclose annual free cash flow in their earnings announcements that year) on firm characteristics, industry peer disclosure, and year fixed effects. 17 Firm characteristics are those the prior literature suggests may be related to either informative or opportunistic motives for disclosure.
As discussed in Section 3, we expect free cash flow disclosure to be incrementally more informative when the adjustments to calculate free cash flow are more relevant: capital intensive firms with deferred revenues and higher leverage. Free cash flows may also be more informative when earnings are less informative: growth firms and firms with more volatile earnings, higher market-to-book ratios, and more one-time events. Alternatively, we expect that the free cash flow disclosure choice is more likely to be motivated by opportunistism when earnings are negative or decreasing, when free cash flow is positive or increasing, or for firms that have either operating or capital leases. We include explanatory variables to capture all of these firm-specific characteristics.
We also include several additional control variables. As noted above, conditional on earnings informativeness, larger firms voluntarily disclose more. Evidence from the demand side [Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) ; Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2005)] shows that more 17 We control for industry peer disclosure in several ways. First, we include the lagged industry average disclosure. Alternatively, we include industry fixed effects (separately, and using industry-year fixed effects). We expect the usefulness of free cash flows to vary by industry (as we discussed previously related to Table 1 , Panel B), which would be picked up with industry fixed effects. We also expect, however, industry peer disclosures to impact firms' decisions to begin or maintain free cash flow disclosures. Because these variables are highly correlated, we consider these similar yet distinct industry determinants separately.
widely-covered firms and firms with more sophisticated (e.g., institutional) investors disclose more. Firms that disclose other non-GAAP measures such as non-GAAP earnings may be more likely to disclose free cash flow (for either informative or opportunistic reasons). Finally, we anticipate that many of the factors motivating disclosure may be industry-specific, and thus also expect firms to be more likely to disclose free cash flows if others in their industry also do so.
Please see Appendix 2 for formal definitions of all of these variables.
In Table 4 we report descriptive statistics for these firm characteristics. Panel A reports results for our full sample of 13,324 firm-years, including firms with and without annual free cash flow disclosure. These firms are relatively large (with mean assets of $12 billion), consistent with our sample firms being part of the S&P 1500. 18 Sales growth averages 9% across our sample, with an average leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio of 0.49 and market-to-book ratio of 2.77.
We partition these variables across firm-years with and without free cash flow disclosure in Panel B. Disclosing firms are larger than non-disclosers. Disclosers also have significantly higher market-to-book ratios, one-time events such as transitory items and discontinued operations, and capital intensity than non-disclosers. They also have lower sales growth, and are significantly more likely to have declining earnings. Both operating and capital lease obligations are higher among disclosers. 19 Our determinants analysis will provide more rigorous evidence regarding the effect of each potential determinant on the decision to disclose free cash flows.
Results: Decision To Disclose
The decision to disclose free cash flow contains several components. First, firms must decide whether to disclose. Once a firm is disclosing it must decide whether to continue disclosing or to stop. Finally,firms must choose the definition. We first analyze the decision to disclose free cash flow. Financial reporting decisions are highly autocorrelated ("sticky"), so the decision for a non-disclosing firm to initiate disclosure is particularly important. We therefore separately analyze the decision to initiate free cash flow disclosure from ongoing disclosure.
Results of the logit regression described in Section 5.1 for the decision to initiate disclosure of free cash flow are reported in Table 5 . The dependent variable equals one for firms that mention free cash flow for the first time in their earnings announcement that year, and zero otherwise. 20 We consider three approaches to time and industry trends. The first is to include year fixed effects as well as the lagged industry average of free cash flow disclosers (presented in the first column of results). The second is to include industry and year fixed effects (in column (2)). The third is to include industry-year fixed effects (in column (3)).
The decision to initiate disclosure is higher for more capital intensive firms in column
(1), consistent with the capital expenditure adjustment in free cash flow being more important for capital intensive firms. Once we replace the lagged industry average disclosure with industry fixed effects in columns (2) and (3), this relation goes away, perhaps reflecting that some industries are more asset intensive, and this variation is now captured in the fixed effects.
Otherwise, the decision to initiate disclosure is not significantly related to any of the variables proxying for information. Thus, unlike non-GAAP earnings disclosures, we find little evidence that free cash flows are initially provided when GAAP earnings are less informative.
20 We exclude firm observations without one year of lagged free cash flow disclosure data from this regression. Thus, the earliest year considered is 2005. We also exclude firm-years that have previously disclosed free cash flow from this analysis (i.e., we do not include "re-starter" or "stopper" firm-year observations).
Disclosure is highly significantly more likely when free cash flow is positive and when free cash flow is increasing. Firms are more likely to begin disclosing free cash flow when its value is favorable, consistent with opportunistic motives. The area under the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve shows that our model explaining the first mention of free cash flows does reasonably well, at over 75 percent (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000, p.162) . It also illustrates that the explanatory power for the opportunism variables is at least three percentage points higher than for the information variables across the specifications.
Regarding the control variables, the initiation of free cash flow disclosure is higher for larger firms (who disclose more in general) and for firms that also disclose another non-GAAP number such as earnings. There is also evidence of herding behavior, as in column (1), lagged industry disclosure is a strong predictor of initiation. A firm is more likely to initiate free cash flow disclosure when other firms in their industry have done so. Although inferences across the three columns are similar, both lagged industry disclosure and year-industry fixed effects result in larger losses of observations. For example, although column (3) allows for a more specific control of the fixed effects, the tradeoff is that we lose about 30 percent of our observations because there is no variation in the dependent variable within certain industry-year groupings.
As an alternative to a logit model, prior research in corporate finance also considers hazard models as a way to estimate the probability of a particular event conditional on the full time series of past explanatory variables [e.g., Shumway (2004) , Whited (2006) , Bharath and Dittmar (2010) ]. In our setting, rather than choosing to disclose free cash flows based on its financial performance as of a particular year, a firm may make this decision conditional on the evolution of its performance leading up to the decision year.
To explore this possibility, in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 we re-estimate the initial disclosure decision using a Cox proportional hazard model instead of a logit regression.
Inferences based on these results are very similar to those provided in the logit regression. From this analysis we conclude the decision to disclose is based primarily on current financial performance (and lagged industry average disclosure) rather than the evolution of performance over time leading up to the current year.
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We next estimate regressions where the dependent variable equals one for any firm-year in which a firm discloses free cash flow and zero otherwise. We intentionally do not include a lagged indicator variable of prior usage in this analysis as we expect this will be a key explanatory variable that may mask other determinants that will be more useful in understanding what types of firms disclose free cash flows. In Table 6 , we report results of the logit regressions discussed above, where the dependent variable equals one for any firm-year in which a firm discloses free cash flow. Results show that, unlike the initiation decision, several of the information variables are statistically significant for ongoing disclosure. Firms are more likely to disclose free cash flow if they are more levered and have higher market-to-book ratios. Firms with more one-time events affecting earnings and cash from operations are also more likely to disclose free cash flows. If these variables correspond to firms for which earnings are less informative and thus less useful for valuation, these results suggest that firms are more likely to disclose when free cash flows are incrementally more informative. Contrary to predictions based on information, firms with more volatile earnings and higher sales growth are less likely to disclose free cash flow, although the coefficients on these variables are only weakly significant.
Of the opportunism variables in Table 6 , the coefficient on the indicator for firms with positive free cash flows continues to be significantly positive, but the indicator for positive changes in free cash flow is no longer significant. Firms with capital leases are also more likely to disclose. Thus, there is some evidence of opportunism for the full sample of ongoing disclosures, although it seems less pervasive than the decision to initiate disclosure. Coefficients on the other control variables for ongoing disclosure are similar to those for the initiation decision. The explanatory power of the information versus opportunism variables (as measured by the area under the ROC curve) is very similar, suggesting that both considerations contribute to the decision. The control variables have consistently higher explanatory power across specifications.
As in Table 5 , inferences based on the specification with industry-year fixed effects are very similar to those in columns (1) and (2), so we are again reassured that this choice of industry control does not affect our conclusions. Therefore, in the remainder of our analyses, we report results using separate industry and year fixed effects.
In summary, although the decision to initiate disclosure of free cash flow tends to be opportunistic, ongoing disclosure has a clearer information motive. In subsequent analyses we use price reactions to the free cash flow disclosure to further assess information content.
Results: Stopping and Restarting
So far, we have considered the decision to disclose and the choice of definition of free cash flow.
We now consider the decision by current disclosers to stop disclosing free cash flows. Is this decision affected by the same factors that prompted initiation?
In Table 7 we report statistics relating to firms that have disclosed free cash flows in our sample for at least one year and then decide to stop disclosing. There are 176 firm-years in which a firm that disclosed in the prior year does not disclose in the current year (Panel A). Of these, 70 of them subsequently restart. There are 189 firms (or 1,258 firm-year observations) that continue disclosing to the end of our sample period (Panel B). The remaining firms stop at least once. Finally, 1,057 (76%) firms never disclose free cash flows during our sample period.
In Panel C of Table 7 , we report results of logit regressions of the stopping and restarting decision on the same explanatory variables considered above. Column (1) reports results for stopping. This sample includes all firms that disclosed in the prior year. The dependent variable equals one for firms that do not disclose this year and zero for firms that continue to disclose.
Results in column (1) show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios and which also disclose other non-GAAP numbers are less likely to stop disclosing. Firms with higher institutional ownership are (weakly) more likely to stop disclosing, and firms with other non-GAAP disclosures are significantly less likely to stop.
In column (2), we examine the decision to restart disclosure. In this regression, the sample firms are those that have previously disclosed in earlier years, stopped disclosing at some point, and did not disclose in the prior year. For this regression, the dependent variable equals one for restarters, and zero for firms that continue not disclosing. Firms that restart have more leverage and less volatile earnings. The decision to restart is also strongly positively related to the presence of decreasing earnings and increasing free cash flows. Although there is no definitive evidence as to what motivates the decision to stop disclosing free cash flow, the restarting decision appears to be largely opportunistic.
Results: Choice of Definition to Disclose
The last issue we analyze related to determinants of disclosure is the choice of which definition of free cash flow to report. As discussed earlier, 45% of our sample free cash flow disclosures contain a simple definition of free cash flows, and the remaining 55% make some incremental adjustments. To explore this decision more fully, we decompose Disclosed FCF into two components,
Simple FCF is the simple definition of free cash flow (OCF -CAPX) as defined in equation (5) above, divided by weighted average diluted shares outstanding and scaled by beginning of period price. FCF Diff represents the incremental adjustments some firms make beyond the simple definition when disclosing free cash flow (and is also divided by weighted average diluted shares outstanding and scaled by beginning of period price).
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We estimate a logit regression to explore the determinants of the decision to disclose a free cash flow measure that is adjusted beyond the simple definition. In this regression, the dependent variable equals zero if the disclosed free cash flow measure equals the simple definition, and one if the firm makes additional adjustments (in other words, if FCF Diff i is different from zero). Explanatory variables are the same information, opportunism, and control variables we use as determinants of the decision to disclose a free cash flow measure.
Results are reported in Table 8 , column (1). Results show that the decision to deviate from the simple definition is significantly positively related to some of our proxies for information content. Adjustments are more likely for capital intensive firms with larger one-time events. We also separately explore the decision to report a free cash flow measure that is higher than the simple definition (column (2)) or lower than the simple definition (column (3)).
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Deviations in both directions are more common for firms with one-time events. This suggests to us that firms remove cash effects relating to the one-time event from their reported free cash flow (regardless of the direction) in order to provide a more informative measure to the market.
Capital intensive firms are more likely to adjust upward relative to the simple definition, and firms with more volatile earnings and growing sales are also more likely to adjust upward.
Considering the opportunism variables, firms for which the simple free cash flow number increases are less likely to disclose an adjusted number, in particular less likely to disclose a number which is adjusted upward. If the simple free cash flow measure looks good, firms are less likely to adjust it, consistent with opportunistic motives for the decision of which definition to report. 24 Finally, with respect to the control variables, larger firms are more likely to disclose an adjusted free cash flow measure (especially one that adjusts downward), and firms with higher analyst following are less likely to adjust the simple definition.
In Table 9 , we explore the individual adjustments in more detail. Specifically, in this table we report results of logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if the firm discloses a free cash flow measure that makes a particular adjustment and zero otherwise. We examine each of the common adjustments reported in Panel D of Table 2 . In column (1), firms with deferred revenue are less likely to consider proceeds from sale of PP&E, perhaps reflecting the underlying motives to initially disclose free cash flows. In column (2), firms with higher sales growth are generally less likely to pay dividends and thus are less likely to subtract them.
On the flip side, larger firms are more likely to pay dividends and are more likely to subtract 24 In contrast, we find results suggesting that firms with positive simple free cash flows are strongly more likely to disclose a different free cash flow value (with a coefficient of 6.134 on this variable in column (1)). This coefficient is of an unreasonable economic magnitude. The magnitude of the coefficient does not extend to either of the next two columns, suggesting it is likely spurious. In column (2), we find some evidence that those with positive simple FCF are less likely to disclose a higher FCF value, suggesting any increased deviation documented in column (1) should be concentrated among disclosing lower FCF values. This empirical relation, however, does not extend to column (3). We are investigating this further.
them from free cash flows. In column (3) we find some evidence that "other adjustments" are more common among firms with declining "simple" free cash flows. Not surprisingly, firms with one-time events are more likely to report free cash flow from continuing operations (column (4)).
Finally, capital intensive firms are less likely to adjust for capital expenditures (column (5)) and more likely to adjust for cash flow from investing (column (7)). It is possible that this is to offset the cash used for capital expeditures with the source of that cash, when the source is the proceeds from the sale of investments. In particular, firms often temporarily house cash in investment vehicles until needed, and thus managers may view cash from the sale of investment vehicles as a distinct source of cash, relative to cash from operations.
Overall, these results suggest to us that, conditional on the decision to disclose free cash flow, there is incremental information in the choice of definition. Firms with wider analyst coverage for which the simple definition of free cash flow looks good are more likely to stick with the simple definition. Firms for which free cash flow disclosure is more likely to provide value-relevant information are more likely to take the additional step of deciding which definition is most meaningful for their firm, adjusting beyond the simple definition. Below, we explore whether the market reaction to the information in the announcement is consistent with this interpretation.
Market Reaction
How does the market react to earnings announcements that include free cash flow disclosure?
To address this question, we regress three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the earnings announcement day on the earnings surprise and disclosed free cash flow: We are interested in whether the market reacts to a firm's decision to disclose free cash flows in general, and also whether the reaction varies based on the specific definition of free cash flow the firm chooses to disclose. Therefore, we also use the decomposition of Disclosed FCF into Simple FCF and FCF Diff defined in equation (6) above, where Simple FCF is the simple definition, and FCF Diff represents the incremental adjustments some firms make beyond the simple definition when disclosing free cash flow (and is also divided by weighted average diluted shares outstanding and scaled by beginning of period price). Using this decomposition, equation (7) 
The coefficient on FCF Diff ( 3  ) allows us to identify whether the market reacts incrementally to information contained in the specific adjustments some firms make beyond the simple definition of free cash flow. Table 10 reports these results. In column (1) we confirm prior research that unexpected earnings are positively associated with the earnings announcement returns, on average. Column (2) reports results of the test of equation (7); the market reaction to the earnings surprise continues to be significant, but there is no incremental reaction to disclosed free cash flows (the coefficient on Disclosed FCF is not significant).
In columns (3) through (5), we present stand-alone estimates of Disclosed FCF, Simple FCF, and FCF Diff. Each exhibits a positive correlation with the earnings announcement returns, although the explanatory power of the estimation is much lower (with the R 2 falling far below that of column (1)). Of these, only the coefficient on FCF Diff is significant.
Column (6) reports results of equation (8), decomposing Disclosed FCF into Simple FCF and FCF Diff. Results again show that the coefficient on simple free cash flows is not significant.
However, the market does react significantly to the incremental adjustments made beyond the simple definition; the coefficient on FCF Diff is again significant. For robustness, in column (7) we report results including Disclosed FCF and FCF Diff in addition to earnings surprises.
Inferences are the same; the market reacts to the earnings surprise and to adjustments made beyond the simple definition of free cash flow. This finding is important because it suggests that different firms face unique situations leading to distinct free cash flow definitions that provide new value-relevant information to investors. This result suggests that requiring all firms to present the same definition could actually reduce the informativeness of the metric.
Conclusion
Free cash flows are a theoretically motivated measure of firm performance that is foundational in the finance literature. Little evidence exists on whether and why managers disclose free cash flows, how they calculate free cash flows, and whether investors price free cash flows. We provide preliminary evidence on each of these questions, documenting that nearly 20% of S&P 1500 firms disclose free cash flows by 2015. Although 45% of free cash flow disclosures are defined as operating cash flows less capital expenditures, within the remaining 55%, there is very
little consensus on what free cash flow constitutes. Calculations vary widely across firms and none correspond to finance theory.
We provide evidence that initial free cash flow disclosures are strongly associated with industry trends, but are also somewhat strategic in that firms are more likely to initiate disclosure when free cash flows are positive and increasing. We provide evidence that maintaining free cash flow disclosures relates to both industry trends as well as to firm characterstics we expect to make free cash flow more useful, such as as when earnings are doing a poorer job as a performance metric. We provide preliminary evidence that managers' idiosyncratic adjustments to free cash flows are incrementally informative to earnings.
As noted above, none of the firms in our sample disclose a free cash flow value as defined by finance theory, and we are unsure why. Perhaps managers choose a relatively simple measure to make the value more understandable to investors, avoiding the complication of adding back interest expense to obtain unlevered free cash flow. Or perhaps this choice is designed to reconcile the number with popular resource tools. For example, Investopedia states:
"Free cash flow (FCF) is a measure of a company's financial performance, calculated as operating cash flow minus capital expenditures." 25 Alternatively, SEC reporting rules require that disclosed free cash flow be reconciled with other reported numbers in the financial statements, and required disclosure does not include the marginal tax rate. Managers may be reluctant to adjust for after-tax interest expense because it would reveal (or require separate reporting of) their marginal tax rate. Consistent with this possibility, no firms adjust for after-tax interest expense to obtain unlevered free cash flows. We leave this question to future research.
Appendix 1 Capital Leases and Free Cash Flow
An alternative method of purchasing property, plant and equipment is to undertake a capital lease. These transactions are deemed more consistent with a purchase than a rental and thus are treated like a purchase for accounting purposes. They result in both an asset (the rights to the leased assets, which are included in property, plant and equipment) and a liability (a lease obligation which is included in debt) on a firm's balance sheet.
26
According to finance theory, these acquisitions should be subtracted from free cash flows as they mirror capital expenditures. In practice, however, very few firms actually remove the acquisition value of the newly leased assets from free cash flows, despite consistently removing capital expenditures. 27 Because fewer than 30% of the firms in our sample have capital leases, this nuance will be moot for much of our sample. At times, however, the fixed assets acquired with capital leases are quite material. After providing an example of how material capital leases can be, we discuss the difficulties in calculating the amount of acquired capital leases using both Compustat and values in the earnings announcement.
As an example of materiality, Amazon has financed a large amount of the growth of their distribution centers through capital leases rather than traditional purchases of fixed assets. In fiscal 2013, they presented the graph in Figure A1 , Panel A, as part of their quarterly conference call materials.
28 During 2013, however, Amazon acquired about $8 billion worth of assets while only reporting $4.6 billion in capital expenditures, as $3.4 billion were acquired with capital leases. Thus, a Motley Fool article highlighted that, after adjusting for capital leases, free cash flows were actually negative (see Figure A1 , Panel B). They conclude, "Amazon's free cash flow is a miragealbeit, a legal and frequently practiced accounting method by many --and it doesn't reflect all of the investments Amazon is making."
We have included capital leases in our theoretically sound definition of free cash flows, although very few firms consider anything related to capital leases in their free cash flow definitions. From our hand-collection, only Amazon (post this Motley Fool article) removes the acquisition amount of capital leases, while a few other firms remove principal repayments of capital leases rather than the acquisition amount.
Thus, this is an adjustment investors should be making, but it is extremely difficult to do with machine-readable data from Compustat. For example, in their 2016 10-K, Amazon highlights that "property and equipment acquired under capital leases" for fiscal 2016 was $5,704 million, whereas purchases of property, plant and equipment was $6,737 million; this $5,704 million is not available in Compustat. 29 Tackling this from the debt angle, the most comparable capital lease data on Compustat are outstanding capital lease obligations (the present value of all contracted lease payments meeting the definition of a capital lease). This obligation increases with originating capital leases, but decreases with capital lease principal payments and any lease terminations, and thus does not provide sufficient information to estimate the amount of fixed assets invest capital leases in any given year. According to Compustat data item "DCLO," Amazon's capital lease obligation was $11,660 and $9,074 million in 2016 and 2015, respectively, with capital lease principal repayments of 3,860 in 2016, implying new capital leases of $6,446. The See Appendix 2 for variable definitions. 
